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We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, where besides unconditional
cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While
pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortion regardless of game parametrization,
myopic updating gives rise to the coexistence of all five strategies if the temptation to defect is sufficiently
large or if the degree distribution of the interaction network is heterogeneous. This counterintuitive evolutionary
outcome emerges as a result of an unexpected chain of strategy invasions. Firstly, defectors emerge and coarsen
spontaneously among players adopting win-stay-lose-shift. Secondly, extortioners and players adopting tit-
for-tat emerge and spread via neutral drift among the emerged defectors. And lastly, among the extortioners,
cooperators become viable too. These recurrent evolutionary invasions yield a five-strategy phase that is stable
irrespective of the system size and the structure of the interaction network, and they reveal the most unexpected
mechanism that stabilizes extortion and cooperation in an evolutionary setting.
Widespread cooperation in nature is one of the most im-
portant challenges to Darwin’s theory of evolution and natu-
ral selection, but it is also the main driving force behind the
evolutionary transitions that led from single-cell organisms to
complex animal and human societies [1]. And it appears to be
this mixture of a fascinating riddle and outmost importance
that makes cooperation so irresistibly attractive to study. Evo-
lutionary game theory [2–6] is thereby the most frequently
employed theoretical framework, revealing mechanisms such
as kin selection [7], network reciprocity [8], direct and in-
direct reciprocity [9, 10], as well as group selection [11] as
potent promoters of cooperative behavior. Adding to these
established five rules for the evolution of cooperation [12], re-
cent years have witnessed a surge of predominantly interdis-
ciplinary studies, linking together knowledge from biology,
sociology, economics as well as mathematics and physics, to
identify new ways by means of which the successful evolution
of cooperation amongst selfish and unrelated individuals can
be understood [13–20].
From the large array of games that make up evolutionary
game theory, none has received as much attention as the pris-
oner’s dilemma game [21–35]. Each instance of the game is
contested by two players who have to decide simultaneously
whether they want to cooperate or defect. The dilemma is
given by the fact that although mutual cooperation yields the
highest collective payoff, a defector will do better if the oppo-
nent decides to cooperate. The rational outcome is thus mu-
tual defection. The popularity of the game was helped signifi-
cantly by the tournaments that were organized by Robert Ax-
elrod [36], where the most successful strategy for the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma game was sought. Interestingly the long-
term winner was the tit-for-tat strategy by the simple and in-
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tuitive virtue of always following the opponent’s previous ac-
tion. However, tit-for-tat cannot correct erroneous moves, and
it is also vulnerable to random drift when mutant strategies
appear which always cooperate [37]. Nowak and Sigmund
therefore proposed win-stay-lose-shift as another equally sim-
ple strategy that has neither of these two disadvantages, and
can outperform tit-for-tat in the prisoner’s dilemma game [22].
Players adopting win-stay-lose-shift simply repeat the previ-
ous move if the resulting payoff has met their aspiration level
and change otherwise.
The simplicity and effectiveness of strategies like tit-for-tat
and win-stay-lose-shift were unrivaled for decades, and they
generated a large following of the seminal works that intro-
duced them. Recently, however, Press and Dyson have intro-
duced a new class of so-called zero-determinant strategies that
can dominate any opponent in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
game [38]. A particularly interesting subset of the class are
extortion strategies, which ensure that an increase in one’s
own payoff exceeds the increase in the other player’s payoff
by a fixed percentage. Extortion is therefore able to dominate
any opponent [39]. But this holds only if players are unable
to change strategies in response to their failures. In an evolu-
tionary setting, where players are able to imitate strategies that
are more successful, extortion was shown to be evolutionary
unstable [40]. If the two players engaged in the game belong
to distinct populations, or if the population size is very small,
on the other hand, extortioners can nevertheless prevail, and
rather counterintuitively, they may also act as catalysts for the
evolution of cooperation [41]. Evolutionary stability can also
be warranted by generous zero-determinant strategies through
their mutually supporting behavior [42].
Results summarized thus far concerning zero-determinant
strategies were obtained in well-mixed populations. Yet it is
well-known that stable solutions in structured population can
differ significantly from those in well-mixed populations. The
most prominent example of this fact is the successful evolu-
tion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
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2through network reciprocity [8]. Further examples include
the stabilization of reward [43], peer and pool punishment
[44, 45], in-group favoritism [46], as well as homophily [47],
to name but a few. Indeed, the fact that the interactions among
players are frequently not random and best described by a
well-mixed model, but rather that they are limited to a set of
other players in the population and as such are best described
by a network, has far-reaching consequences for the outcome
of evolutionary processes [13, 15, 16, 18, 19].
Motivated by this, we have recently shown that in struc-
tured populations the microscopic dynamic that governs strat-
egy updating plays a decisive role for the fate of extortioners
[48]. By using the simplest three-strategy model, compris-
ing cooperators (C), defectors (D), and extortioners (Eχ), we
have shown that pairwise imitation and birth-death dynam-
ics return the same evolutionary outcomes as reported previ-
ously in well-mixed populations. The usage of myopic best
response strategy updating, on the other hand, renders extor-
tion evolutionary stable via neutral drift. Counterintuitively,
the stability of extortioners helps cooperators to survive even
under the most testing conditions, whereby the neutral drift of
Eχ players serves as the entry point, akin to a Trojan horse,
for cooperation to grab a hold among defectors. Although the
mutually rewarding checkerboard-like coexistence of cooper-
ators and extortioners can always be temporarily disturbed by
defectors, it is only a matter of time before the neutral drift
reintroduce extortioners and the whole cycle starts anew.
Here we extend our study to five competing strategies, tak-
ing into account also the tit-for-tat strategy (TFT ) and the
win-stay-lose-shift strategy (WSLS), in addition to the pre-
vious three that we have studied in [48]. The five strategies
D, C, Eχ, TFT , and WSLS are the same as studied re-
cently by Hilbe et al. [41] in well-mixed populations, with the
strength of the social dilemma b and the strength of exploita-
tion χ being the two main parameters that determine the pay-
offs amongst the strategies. For details about the parametriza-
tion of the game and the applied updating rules, we refer to
the Methods section. The inclusion of the tit-for-tat strategy
and the win-stay-lose-shift strategy promises fascinating evo-
lutionary outcomes, especially since under well-mixed condi-
tions D can beat WSLS, but the dominance reverses in the
presence of the other three strategies. As we will show in
the next Section, in structured populations WSLS dominate
completely for sufficiently small values of b if the interaction
network is characterized by a homogeneous degree distribu-
tion. Beyond a threshold value of b, or if the interaction net-
work is characterized by a heterogeneous degree distribution
(see for example [49]), however, D emerge and coarsen spon-
taneously, which in turn opens up the possibility for all the
other strategies to emerge as well.
Results
Before turning to the main results obtained with myopic
best response updating, we present in Fig. 1 the evolutionary
outcomes obtained via imitation on a square lattice. If imi-
tation is the basis of strategy updating, then neither cooper-
FIG. 1: Imitation on a square lattice fails to sustain cooperation and
extortion. Depicted are the stationary frequencies of surviving strate-
gies in dependence on the strength of the social dilemma b. It can
be observed that for sufficiently small values of b only WSLS sur-
vive. As b increases, the pure WSLS phase first gives way to a nar-
row two-strategy WSLS+D phase, which then transforms into the
three-strategy WSLS + TFT +D phase. The emergence of these
three different phases is a direct consequence of dominance relations
between the three involved strategies, which are schematically de-
picted in the bottom frame for the respective values of b from left to
right. Arrows show the direction of invasion between strategies.
ators nor extortioners can survive, and this regardless of the
strength of the social dilemma and the strength of exploita-
tion. Since extortioners always die out, the composition of
the final state is actually completely independent of χ. We
have used χ = 1.5 for the presented results, but the value in-
fluences only the time needed for relaxation towards the fi-
nal stable solution. Starting with b ≥ 1 (we show results
from b = 1.5 onwards for clarity with regards to the sub-
sequent phase transitions), the completely dominant strategy
is WSLS. At the other end of the interval of b, we have a
stable three-strategyWSLS+TFT +D phase, which is sus-
tained by cyclic dominance. In between, we have a narrow
two-strategy WSLS + D phase, which terminates immedi-
ately after D reach dominance.
This dependence on b can be understood by considering the
relations among the surviving strategies, as summarized in the
bottom frame of Fig. 1. For small values of b (left), WSLS
dominate both D and TFT . The latter also dominate D, but
their superior status in this relationship has no effect on the
final state. For high values of b (right), the direction of inva-
sion between WSLS and D changes compared to the low b
case, while the other two relations remain unchanged. Con-
sequently, instead of a pure WSLS phase, we have a three-
strategy WSLS + TFT + D phase, where WSLS invade
TFT , TFT invadeD, andD invadeWSLS to close the loop
of dominance. It is worth emphasizing that this solution is im-
3FIG. 2: The coexistence of defectors and players adopting the win-
stay-lose-shift strategy in case of imitation on a square lattice. De-
picted is the time evolution of the frequency of defectors fD as ob-
tained for b = 1.7, 1.734, 1.736, 1.738, 1.739 and 1.741 from bot-
tom to top. The time courses provide insight into the competition for
space within the narrow two-strategy WSLS +D phase that can be
observed in Fig. 1. At b = 1.741 defectors come to dominate the
whole population, but their dominance is immediately overthrown in
favor of the three-strategy WSLS + TFT + D phase that is sus-
tained by cyclic dominance. The used linear size of the square lattice
is L = 1000. Note that the time scale is logarithmic.
possible in a well-mixed population for all b < 2.
In a narrow interval between the pure WSLS phase and
the cyclic WSLS + TFT + D phase, we have the situation
depicted in the middle of the bottom frame of Fig. 1, where
unlike for small and high values of b, the relation between
WSLS and D enables their coexistence in a structured pop-
ulation. As for small values of b, here too TFT can invade
D, but this is without effect on the final outcome. The sta-
ble two-strategy coexistence is illustrated in Fig. 2, where we
show how WSLS and D compete for space over time for dif-
ferent values of b. The larger the value of b, the smaller the
fraction of the population that is occupied by WSLS in the
stationary state. Interestingly, when b is large enough for D to
fully eliminate WSLS, the complete dominance of defectors
is prevented by the presence of TFT , who become viable via
a second-order continuous phase transition. From this point
onwards, the cyclic dominance WSLS → TFT → D →
WSLS starts working until the end of the interval of b, as
depicted in the main panel of Fig. 1.
Overall, extortion is unable to capitalize on structured in-
teractions if the strategy updating is governed by imitation or
a birth-death rule (results not shown), and in fact this is in full
qualitative agreement with the results obtained in well-mixed
populations [40, 41]. In the realm of evolutionary games, ex-
tortioners do not do well against cooperative strategies like C,
TFT andWSLS. They may thrive for a short period of time,
but as soon extortion becomes widespread, it is more prof-
itable to cooperate, which ultimately renders extortion evolu-
tionary unstable.
FIG. 3: Myopic best response updating in structured populations sta-
bilizes extortion and cooperation. Depicted are the stationary fre-
quencies of surviving strategies in dependence on the strength of the
social dilemma b, as obtained for the strength of extortion χ = 1.5
on the square lattice (top), the random regular graph (middle), and
the scale-free network (bottom). It can be observed that players
adopting the WSLS strategy dominate for sufficiently small val-
ues of b on homogeneous interaction networks (top and middle), but
as b increases or if the interaction network is heterogeneous (bot-
tom), the pure WSLS phase gives way to a stable five-strategy
WSLS +D + Eχ + TFT + C phase. (continues on next page)
4FIG. 3: (continues from previous page) Here defectors emerge and
coarsen spontaneously because for sufficiently large values of b their
payoff becomes larger than that of clustered WSLS players. The
emergence of defectors immediately opens the door to the survival
of extortioners and TFT players, which both emerge by chance and
spread by means of neutral drift. Lastly, with the emergence of ex-
tortioners and TFT players cooperators become viable as well, thus
forming the stable five-strategy phase. The latter is virtually unaf-
fected by different values of χ, as demonstrated in Fig. 4. Impor-
tantly, the described coexistence of the competing strategies is a uni-
versal behavior that can be observed in structured populations regard-
less of the properties of the interaction network, and even across the
whole span of b values, as illustrated in the bottom panel. Character-
istic snapshots depicting the described key stages of the evolutionary
process are presented in Fig. 5.
Myopic strategy updating, on the other hand, can sustain
very different evolutionary outcomes as it allows players to
adopt strategies that are not necessarily present in their inter-
action neighborhood. In fact, strategies need not be present
in the population at all, as long as they are an option for the
players to choose randomly when it is their turn to perhaps
change their strategy. Nevertheless, we emphasize that my-
opic best response updating is different from mutation, be-
cause each individual strategy change is still driven by the
payoff difference, as described by Eq. 1. Results presented
in Fig. 3 obtained on the square lattice (top) and the random
regular graph (middle) show that for sufficiently small values
of b the final state is the same as under imitation dynamics.
Players adopting WSLS dominate completely from b = 1
onwards (as in Fig. 1, we show results for b ≥ 1.5 only).
At a critical value of b, however, a second-order continuous
phase transition rather unexpectedly leads to the stable coex-
istence of all five competing strategies. A similar diversity
of strategies prevails on heterogeneous interaction networks,
as illustrated by the results obtained on a scale-free network
shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 3. Myopic best response
updating is thus able to stabilize extortion in structured pop-
ulations. Perhaps even more surprisingly, as the strength of
the social dilemma increases, the two cooperative strategies
C and TFT become viable as well. This outcome is rather
independent of the structure of the interaction network.
Since extortioners survive for sufficiently high values of b,
the strength of extortion χ might play a role too, but as evi-
denced by the results presented in Fig. 4, this role is in fact
very minor. As the value of χ increases, the extortioners be-
come slightly more common on the expense of TFT and C
players, but overall this does not affect the evolutionary sta-
bility of extortion and cooperation. Compared to our previ-
ous results presented in [48], where we have studied the three
strategy variant of the game without TFT and WSLS play-
ers, the role of χ is less significant here mainly because the
stationary frequency of extortioners is much smaller. The fact
that their frequency is much smaller, however, is a direct con-
sequence of the presence of the two additional cooperative
strategies (TFT and WSLS), which in turn highlights the
general subordinate role of extortioners compared to coopera-
tion in evolutionary games. The latter was emphasized already
FIG. 4: The strength of extortion has a negligible impact on the sta-
tionary frequencies of competing strategies, and it does not affect the
evolutionary stability of extortion and cooperation. Depicted are the
stationary frequencies of surviving strategies in dependence on the
strength of extortion χ, as obtained for the social dilemma strength
b = 2 on a square lattice. It can be observed that the variations of
all frequencies are small. Expectedly, larger values of χ favor extor-
tion. The neutral drift of TFT players therefore becomes slightly
less prolific, which in turn also slightly decreases the frequency of
cooperators. Interestingly, the stationary frequencies of strategies at
b = 2 and their χ-dependency are practically indistinguishable for
the square lattice and the random regular graph. This further high-
lights the irrelevance of the structure of the interaction network under
myopic best response updating, and thus also the universality of the
presented results.
in [40, 41], as well as by the results presented in Fig. 1 above.
Also contributing to the minor role of χ is that the emergence
of extortioners is in fact a second-order effect, as we will ex-
plain next.
To understand why Eχ, TFT and C emerge as b increases,
it is instructive to consider the erosion of the pure WSLS
phase on square lattice, as illustrated in Fig. 5. For a suf-
ficiently high value of b defectors emerge and start coarsen
spontaneously because their payoff becomes competitive with
the payoff of aggregated WSLS players. The emergence of
the D phase, however, paves the way for the emergence of all
the other strategies. Namely, both Eχ and TFT are neutral
againstD, and thus they may emerge by chance and spread via
neutral drift. As Eχ accumulate locally, C become viable too
because their payoff is higher. The emergence of C is helped
further (or at least not hindered) by TFT , who are neutral
with C. During this unexpected chain of strategy invasions,
defection and extortion thus emerge as catalysts of uncondi-
tional cooperation. Effectively, the defectors act as a Trojan
horse for all the other strategies, while subsequently the ex-
tortioners act as a Trojan horse for cooperation. Evidently,
the spreading of C, which utilizes the neutral drift of Eχ, will
be controlled by defectors and WSLS players who can strike
back since their presence in place of an extortioner may yield
a higher payoff in a predominantly cooperative neighborhood.
5FIG. 5: Characteristic time evolution of the spatial distribution of
the five competing strategies on a square lattice. The evolution starts
from the fullWSLS phase (not shown), using b = 1.8 and χ = 1.5.
At MCS = 5 (leftmost panel), first defectors start emerging be-
cause their payoff is comparable with WSLS players. Soon there-
after, at MCS = 10 (second panel from left), first extortioners and
TFT players emerge. Both have neutral relations with the defec-
tors, and thus their emergence and spreading are due to chance and
neutral drift. At MCS = 30, as soon as locally the number of ex-
tortioners becomes sufficiently large, cooperators emerge as well due
to their higher payoffs, and their spreading is additionally supported
by the TFT players. The recurrence of these elementary processes
eventually spreads a stable mixture of all five strategies across the
whole population, as depicted in the rightmost panel that was taken
at MCS = 100. The color encoding of the strategies is the same as
used in Figs. 3 and 4. For clarity with regards to individual players
and their strategies, we have used a small square lattice with linear
size L = 40.
This, however, will again be only temporary, since the de-
scribed elementary invasions are bound to recur, thus assuring
the stability of the WSLS +D + Eχ + TFT + C phase.
An important lesson learned from the presented results in
Fig. 5 is that although extortion can be as counterproductive as
defection, it is still less destructive. For an unconditional co-
operator it never pays sticking with the strategy if surrounded
by defectors, but it may be the best option among extortioners.
Cooperators are of course happiest among other cooperators,
but in the presence of extortioners they can still attain a posi-
tive payoff, and this is much better than nothing or a negative
value in the presence of defectors. It is worth emphasizing
that this argument is valid independently of the properties of
the interaction network, as the described chain of strategy in-
vasions emerges in all the structured populations that we have
considered.
Discussion
We have shown that even if the set of competing strate-
gies is extended to encompass, besides unconditional cooper-
ators, defectors and extortioners [48], also the tit-for-tat strat-
egy and the win-stay-lose-shift strategy, the imitation dynam-
ics in structured populations is still unable to render extor-
tion evolutionary stable. For sufficiently small values of b
only players adopting the win-stay-lose-shift strategy survive,
while beyond a threshold value a stable three-strategy phase
consisting of defectors, tit-for-tat and win-stay-lose-shift play-
ers emerges. Since extortioners never survive, the strength of
exploitation χ is without effect. These results agree with those
reported previously for sizable isolated well-mixed popula-
tions [41], and they highlight the severe challenges that ex-
tortioners face when vying for survival in the realm of evolu-
tionary games where players are able to imitate strategies that
are performing better [40].
If the evolution is governed by myopic best response up-
dating, however, the outcomes are significantly different from
those obtained via imitation. We have shown that for suffi-
ciently large values of b the complete dominance of win-stay-
lose-shift players is broken as soon as defectors emerge and
start coarsening. Subsequently, within the homogeneous do-
mains of defectors, extortion becomes viable too via the same
mechanism as we have described before in [48]. In particular,
extortioners and defectors are neutral, and hence the former
can emerge by chance and spread via neutral drift. Yet as
soon as extortioners emerge, cooperators can finally emerge
as well, because in competition with the former they are su-
perior. In this evolutionary scenario, defection and extortion
thus act as the most surprising catalysts of unconditional coop-
eration in structured populations. Moreover, we have shown
that the coexistence of all competing strategies occurs across
the whole interval of b values if a heterogeneous (scale-free)
network describes the interactions among players. Because of
this unlikely path towards cooperation, we conclude that de-
fectors and extortioners effectively play the role of a Trojan
horse for cooperators. Interestingly, similar transient roles of
extortionate behavior were recently reported in the realm of
well-mixed populations when studying the adaptive dynamics
of extortion and compliance [50]. Moreover, after the emer-
gence and coarsening of defectors, in the presently studied
game the tit-for-tat players also become viable as they are
likewise neutral, and can thus spread via neutral drift just like
extortioners. In recurrence, these evolutionary processes give
rise to a stable five-strategy phase that is hardly affected by
the strength of exploitation χ, and it is also robust to the pop-
ulation size and the structure of the interaction network.
Taken together, these results thus have a high degree of uni-
versality and highlight the relevance of coarsening, the emer-
gence of role-separating strategy distributions (which mani-
fests as checkerboard ordering on regular graphs), and best
response updating in evolutionary games. The latter is espe-
cially important, as it appears to be an integral part of hu-
man behavior [51–53]. From the more pragmatical point of
view, best response updating conveys to the players an ability
to explore the space of available strategies even if they are not
present in their immediate neighborhood or even in the pop-
ulation as a whole, and by doing so, such updating dynamics
opens up the door to the most counterintuitive evolutionary
outcomes. Similarly to kin competition, the presented results
also highlight the other side of network reciprocity. Namely, it
does not only support cooperative behavior by means of clus-
tering, but it also reveals the consequences of bad decisions
– defectors and extortioners become weak when they become
surrounded by their like. From this point of view, it is un-
derstandable and indeed expected that structured populations,
if anything, hinder the successful evolution of extortion un-
der imitation. The surprising positive role of extortioners be-
comes apparent only under best response updating, where the
threatening loom of widespread defection is drifted away by
the lesser evil to eventually introduce more constructive coop-
erative strategies.
6Methods
We adopt the same game parametrization as Hilbe et al.
[41]. Accordingly, the payoff matrix for the five competing
strategies is
TFT WSLS Eχ all C all D
TFT 12
1
2 0 1 0
WSLS 12 1
(2b−1)χ
3b−2+(3b−1)χ
b+1
2
1−b
2
Eχ 0
(2b−1)χ
3b−2+(3b−1)χ 0
(2b−1)χ
b−1+bχ 0
all C 1 2−b2
2b−1
b−1+bχ 1 1− b
all D 0 b2 0 b 0
where b is the benefit to the other player provided by
each cooperator at the cost c, and χ determines the surplus of
the extortioner in relation to the surplus of the other player.
Moreover, we use b− c = 1, thus having b > 1 and χ > 1 as
the two main parameters. The former determines the strength
of the social dilemma, while the latter determines just how
strongly strategy Eχ exploits cooperators. A direct compari-
son of the extortioner strategy with the other strategies reveals
that Eχ is neutral with unconditional defectors and players
adopting the TFT strategy. The latter, however, may beat
Eχ if they are surrounded by other TFT players. Similar
relations hold for the competition between Eχ and WSLS
players. While the latter receive the same income from a
direct interaction, they do gain more if the neighbors also
adopt the WSLS strategy. It is also worth noting that the
payoffs between C and D constitute the so-called donation
game, which is an important special case of the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma game with all the original properties
retained [54].
We predominantly consider a L × L square lattice with
periodic boundary conditions as the simplest interaction net-
work to describe a structured population. To demonstrate
the robustness of our findings, we also use a random regular
graph and the scale-free network with the same average de-
gree, which is likely somewhat more apt to describe realistic
social and technological networks [55]. We have used pop-
ulation sizes from 104 up to 106 players to avoid finite-size
effects.
Unless stated differently, for example to illustrate a specific
invasion process as in Fig. 5, we use random initial conditions
such that all five strategies are uniformly distributed across
the network. We carry out Monte Carlo simulations compris-
ing the following elementary steps. First, a randomly selected
player x with strategy sx acquires its payoff px by playing the
game with its k neighbors, as specified by the underlying in-
teraction network. Next, player x changes its strategy sx to s′x
with the probability
q(s′x → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(px − p′x)/K]
(1)
where p′x is the payoff of the same player if adopting strategy
s′x within the same neighborhood, and K = 0.05 quantifies a
small uncertainty that is related to the strategy adoption pro-
cess [15]. The strategy s′x should of course be different from
sx, and it is drawn randomly from the remaining four strate-
gies. Such strategy updating is known as the myopic best re-
sponse rule [51].
We also consider the more traditional strategy imitation,
where player x imitates the strategy of a randomly selected
neighbor y, only that p′x in Eq. 1 is replaced by py [15], as
well as death-birth updating as described for example in [56].
Regardless of the applied strategy updating rule, we let the
system evolve towards the stationary state where the average
frequency of strategies becomes time independent. We mea-
sure time in full Monte Carlo steps (MCS), during which
each player is given a chance to change its strategy once on
average.
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